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UID:pretalx-2026-EZULC3@cfp.nsec.io
DTSTART;TZID=EST:20260515T100000
DTEND;TZID=EST:20260515T103000
DESCRIPTION:Internet shutdowns are often described as a single action — 
 “turning the Internet off.” In practice\, they are the result of caref
 ully orchestrated\, multi-layered technical controls applied across nation
 al infrastructure. Building on my previous talk at BSides\, which introduc
 ed the fundamental mechanisms of Internet censorship and shutdowns\, this 
 session presents a deeper and more comprehensive technical analysis of the
  2026 Internet blackout in Iran.\n\nThis talk treats large-scale censorshi
 p not as a political phenomenon\, but as a network engineering and securit
 y operation. We examine who has the technical authority to execute shutdow
 ns\, how different censorship techniques are layered and coordinated\, and
  when specific tactics are selectively deployed to maximize impact while m
 aintaining internal network functionality.\n\nThe analysis spans multiple 
 layers of the stack. At the routing level\, we examine BGP route withdrawa
 ls\, path manipulation\, and international transit isolation. At the acces
 s and transport layers\, we analyze ISP-level service suppression\, mobile
  network data blackouts\, and traffic throttling. At the protocol and appl
 ication layers\, we explore deep packet inspection (DPI)\, protocol finger
 printing\, encrypted traffic degradation\, and selective blocking of VPNs\
 , QUIC\, and TLS-based services.\n\nSpecial attention is given to the role
  of national intranet architectures\, which allow domestic services to rem
 ain reachable while international connectivity collapses\, creating the il
 lusion of partial availability. The session also addresses the technical l
 imits of alternative access methods\, including satellite Internet\, and w
 hy such technologies are not a universal solution under state-scale contro
 ls.\n\nUsing timelines\, traffic behavior\, and protocol-level indicators\
 , the talk demonstrates that modern Internet shutdowns are graduated\, ada
 ptive\, and measurable rather than binary events. Attendees will learn how
  these techniques manifest on the wire\, how they can be detected from ins
 ide and outside the affected region\, and why many common circumvention st
 rategies fail under coordinated\, nation-state enforcement.\n\nThis presen
 tation is intended for security professionals\, network engineers\, and re
 searchers interested in Internet resilience\, censorship measurement\, and
  large-scale network interference\, offering a technically grounded contin
 uation of prior research and real-world observations.
DTSTAMP:20260507T203534Z
LOCATION:Salle de bal
SUMMARY:Internet Blackout 2026 in Iran — Next-Level Internet Censorship: 
 A Technical Breakdown of Techniques and Tactics. - Reza Sharifi
URL:https://cfp.nsec.io/2026/talk/EZULC3/
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